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Foreign activities of MNEs have important effects on home economies. The debate is 
ambiguous: concerns that foreign investments deplete domestic economies are often 
coupled with the pride for doing good business in foreign countries. This paper 
addresses this question by defining the appropriate counterfactual: what would have 
happened to investing firms if they had not invested abroad.  It applies propensity score 
matching to derive these hypothetical performance trajectories from a sample of 
national firms which never invested abroad.  For a sample of Italian firms, it finds that 
investments improves growth of total factor productivity and output. It also finds no 
significant effects on employment. These results support the view that foreign 
investments strengthen rather than depleting home activities. 
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The activities of Multinationals (MNEs) have effects on home economies. The 
laymen’s perception of these effects is mixed. They share national pride when their 
MNEs do well in Fortunes’ ranking of the largest firms in the world, but they worry 
when they see their companies closing down domestic plants and opening up new ones 
abroad. The issue is indeed complex and there is very little empirical evidence 
supporting either the pessimist or the optimist. Outward investments divert national 
resources from home to foreign countries. This diversion could enrich home activities, 
as far as the value added of what is done at home increases, or it may impoverish them 
if the size of home activities shrinks and consequent externalities get depleted. This 
paper examines the effects of outward investments on the home activities of MNEs. It 
does so by analysing the performance of a sample of Italian firms which invest abroad 
for the first time in the period analysed and by comparing these firms to a sample of 
firms that do not invest abroad. It will focus on three measures of performance: total 
factor productivity, employment and output growth. 
 
The key effect we are interested in is contribution to home real income.  Do 
firms improve performance at home by investing abroad? Theoretical predictions are 
not clear cut. There are three main reasons why opening and running foreign 
subsidiaries affect domestic productivity: the exploitation of firm-level and plant-level 
scale economies; the change in t he composition of inputs used in production; the 
opening of new channels of international sourcing of technological and managerial 
knowledge. These sources of productivity change may work in both directions, 
depending on the features of the investment. The scale of home activities could decline 
or increase; technologies could be acquired in foreign markets or get depleted to foreign 
competitors; home activities could get strengthened or impoverished by changes in their 
factor use (see Barba Navaretti, Venables et al., 2003 for a thorough discussion of this 
issue). 
                                                 
§ The authors wish to thank Alberto Pozzolo, Rachel Griffith and participants to the CEPR-IMOT 
Workshop on “FDI and the Multinational Corporation” and  the Conference on “Foreign Investments, 
Outsourcing and Competitveness” for helpful comments on an earlier draft.   3 
  
Besides for performance, the size of economic activity at home per se 
(independently form its effects on productivity) is a major concern when firms invest 
abroad. But once more, theory provides good rationale for both options.  It all depends 
on whether firms substitute domestic labour and output with foreign activities or 
whether expanding foreign activities complement domestic ones  
 
Given that the theory does not provide any clear prediction, at this stage the 
question boils down to an empirical one.  Earlier empirical works have examined the 
effects on output (Head and Ries, 2001, Blonigen, 2001), home employment (Brainard 
and Riker, 1997a, 1997b, Braconier and Eckholm, 2002, Konigs and Murphy, 2001, 
Bruno and Falzoni, 2000, Blomstrom, Fors and Lipsey, 1997, Lipsey, 1999, Bassino, 
1998, Mariotti, Mutinelli and Piscitello, 2003) and productivity (Braconier, Eckholm, 
Midelfart Knarvik 2001, Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001) of 
outward FDI. They generally find evidence that outward investments do not deplete 
home activities.   
 
However, these studies focus either at the sectoral/regional level or, when 
addressing the question at the firm-level, focus on the activities of MNEs and thus fail 
to take into account the appropriate counterfactual to this problem. The effects of 
outward investments on home activities are not just relevant per se, but with respect to 
what would have happened if firms had not invested abroad. Think at firms in 
traditional sectors like textile, facing competition from imports from developing 
countries. Transferring stages of production to cheap labour countries could be the only 
strategy for survival for these firms. Even though home employment declines, it would 
have declined even more if these firms had not invested. Albeit this cannot be observed, 
their hypothetical behaviour can be proxied by the behaviour of a sample of other firms 
which have not invested. There are now only a few firm level studies comparing MNEs 
and national firms in home countries, mostly because of a lack of comprehensive data 
sets combining information for national and multinational firms
1. These studies 
                                                 
1 In particular, Doms and Jensen (1998) provide evidence on the US, Criscuolo and Martin (2003) and 
Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2003) on the UK, Castellani and Zanfei (2003) on Italy, Pfaffermyr and Bellak   4 
compare the activities of national firms, foreign subsidiaries and headquarters of 
multinationals based in their sample countries. They find that national firms generally 
perform worse than both types of multinationals. Anyway, these studies pursue a 
different objective than this paper. They are focussed on the analysis of the composition 
effect of MNEs (whether MNEs are different from national firms) rather than on the 
analysis of the effects of investing on performance. 
 
With respect to these earlier works this paper introduces three innovations in the 
empirical analysis of these issues. First, it uses a new data base of Italian firms, 
combining information on Italian multinationals and a random sample of national firms 
Second, it focuses on firms that change status from national to multinational by 
investing abroad for the first time. It is therefore possible to single out the effects of the 
investment by comparing firms’ performance before and after the investment. Third, it 
uses propensity score matching to construct an appropriate counterfactual of national 
firms and uses a difference-in-difference estimator (DID) to compare the performance 
of the two types of firms. 
 
We find that the home performance of Italian firms that invest abroad for the first 
time during the period analysed improves after the investment. The post-investment rate 
of growth of output and productivity is higher than the one observed over the same 
period for the counterfactual of non-investing firms.  Also, there is no significant 
evidence of a slowing down of the rate of employment growth. Thus, the evidence 
supports the optimistic view that foreign investments do strengthen and do not deplete 
economic activities at home.  
 
The next section outlines the main channels through which foreign investments may 
influence performance at home. Section three revises the available evidence on these 
effects. Section 4 discusses the methodology used to construct the counterfactual of NEs 
                                                                                                                                               
(2002) on Austria, Bellman and Jungnickel (2002) on Germany and De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) 
on Belgium.   5 
and the DID estimators. Section 5 and 6 report the data used and the main results of the 
empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Analysing the performance of investing firms: the issue 
  
 
An empirical test of the effects of foreign investments on performance at home 
poses several methodological problems. First, if we observe only MNEs we cannot 
single out the hypothetical benchmark: performance if the MNEs had not invested 
abroad. Moreover,  if we observe only MNEs, we do not know if changes in 
performance are due to unobservable shocks equally affecting all firms, national and 
multinational alike. It is therefore important to benchmark MNEs to a sample of 
national firms. However, when comparing the performance of MNEs and national 
firms, we face a second problem: we do not know if differences are due to other 
observable or unobservable characteristics of the two types of firms (e.g. size, ability of 
management etc.) rather than to their being multinational or strictly national. In 
particular, foreign investments and performance are jointly determined. Given that 
investing abroad entices large costs, with imperfect financial markets only the (ex-ante)  
most productive firms will invest abroad. Thus, if we observe that ex-post MNEs 
perform better than national firms, we do not know if this is so because of foreign 
investments or because these firms performed better anyway, even before the 
investment.  
 
To address these problems, it is possible to draw on the now well established 
literature investigating the effects of exporting on firms’ performance (Bernard and 
Jensen, 1999, Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998, Aw, Chung and Roberts, 2000, 
Castellani, 2002b, Delgado et al., 2002, Girma et al. 2002, Kraay, 1999). Indeed, the 
exporter faces the same problem of a firm investing abroad. Consequently, the analysis 
of the effects of these two decisions raises similar methodological problems.  
   6 
To illustrate the kind of exercise we carry out in this paper, it is useful to discuss 
Figure 1 which is derived from Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) and adapted to the 
case of foreign investments. We draw average hypothetical trajectories in home 
performance for three types of firms: those which are always MNEs, i.e. with at least 
one foreign subsidiary during all the period observed; those which never have a foreign 
subsidiary in the period observed (NATIONAL) and those that open their first foreign 
subsidiary in the period observed and therefore switch from being national into being 
MNEs (SWs) at time t.  
 
Compare the trajectory of MNEs and NATIONALs. We assume that MNEs perform 
better than NATIONALs. This assumption reflects what emerges from all available 
studies: on average MNEs at home always perform better than NATIONALs (Barba 
Navaretti, Venables et al. 2003, Castellani and Zanfei, 2003; Criscuolo and Martin, 
2002; Girma, Kneller and Pisu, 2003, Doms and Jensen, 1998; Frenz et al., 2002, 
Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2002, Bellman and Jungnickel, 2002, De Backer and 
Sleuwaegen, 2003). However, the  trajectory of MNEs could lie above the one of 
NATIONALs both because they were the best performing firms even before becoming 
multinationals, or because performances improved as a result of international 
production 
 
More can be learned if we now focus on SWs, those which invest for the first time at 
t0.  If the investment has a positive effect on productivity their trajectory becomes 
steeper at t0 and performance converges to the one of MNEs. Thus, our empirical 
question can be answered by comparing their trajectory after the investment to the one 
that they would have followed had they not invested. If the investment does indeed 
improve performance, this hypothetical trajectory lies below the one of the  SWs after t, 
as represented by the dotted line in figure 1. This comparison is important, as if we just 
focus on effective performance, even if we observe that it improves,  this could be the 
outcome of other unobserved random factors which have nothing to do with the 
investment. Unfortunately, the dotted line cannot be observed and we need to proxy it. 
Good candidates for the counterfactual are NATIONAL firms, so we could compare the   7 
performance trajectory of SWs, with the one of NATIONALs. However, we still have a 
problem. The trajectory of the appropriate counterfactual should differ from the one of 
SWs just because of the different investment decision. But firms are heterogeneous, 
even within the same industry, and SWs could be different from NATIONALs even 
before the investment. The assumption of most  of the literature is that operating in a 
foreign environment involves additional costs and risks and then only firms possessing 
some intangible capital giving them a competitive edge over national firms are able to 
overcome such disadvantage and invest abroad (Dunning, 1993; Markusen, 1995). 
Because of this self-selection the average NATIONAL is not a good benchmark: it is 
ex-ante different from the SW, and this difference may affect ex-post performance. 
Accordingly, we draw the performance trajectory of SWs before the investment above 
the one of NATIONALs. If we want to isolate the effect of investing, we need to build a 
counterfactual made of NATIONALs which are as similar as possible to firms which 
have invested.  
 
To do so, in what follows we derive a control group from a propensity score 
matching procedure. The performance trajectory of this control group is the closest 
approximation to the dotted line. We will then be able to compare post-investment 
performances in the two groups. To do so we will use standard matching estimators 
which essentially compare the post t slope of the thick line to the one of the dotted line 
and difference-in-difference estimators, which compare the change in the slope of the 
thick line and of the dotted line before and after t.    8 
Figure 1 – Performance trajectories in home plants 
 
3.  The evaluation problem: propensity score matching and difference-in-
difference estimators  
 
As illustrated in section 2, our aim is to evaluate the effect of becoming a 
multinational firm on economic performance at home,  y D  (where  y D  denotes the rate 
of growth of employment, output or total factor productivity (TFP))
2. To gather this 
effect we need to understand what would have happened to the firm’s economic 
performance had it not invested abroad. Let SWit be an indicator taking value equal to 
one if firm i switches into becoming a multinational by investing abroad for the first 
time at time t (i.e. between t-1 and t). Let also 
1
1 , + D t i y  be firm i’s  post-investment 
performance and 
0
1 , + D t i y  the hypothetical performance achieved at t+1 had i not invested 
abroad. The effect of investing abroad on economic performances for firm i would then 




1 , + + D - D t i t i y y . More formally, this average effect can be expressed as 
follows
3: 
                                                 
2 This is usually defined the ‘outcome’ in the evaluation literature. See Blundell and Costa Dias (1999, 
2002), and Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 18) for reviews. 
3 In the literature this is referred to as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The original idea 
is derived from natural sciences, where some outcome from individuals who receive a treatment (i.e. a 
medical treatment) is compared to identical individuals (randomly drawn from a population) who did not 
receive treatment. In economics things are complicated by the fact that non-treated individuals are non-





SWs (Switching firms)  
MNEs 
Benchmark: hypothetical 
trajectory if switching 
firms had not invested   9 
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The key problem is that the last term is unobservable, i.e. we do not know what 
would have been the average performance of SWs if they had not invested. We need to 
find an appropriate measure for the last term in our sample or, in other words, we need 
to construct an appropriate counterfactual, based on the right control group. If we were 
to run a natural experiment, we could randomly draw a sample of firms from a 
population and let one half to invest and the other not to invest. This latter group would 
be the appropriate control group. Unfortunately, as argued in section 2, firms choose 
endogenously whether to invest or not. A path followed in the literature to overcome 
self-selection is to use the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator
4. This estimator has 
however the drawback that the choice of instruments is not straightforward, in particular 
in cross-sections, and results might be sensitive to the choice of the instrument set
5.  
 
An alternative approach, which we follow here, is the method of matching, which 
aims at re-establishing the conditions of a natural experiment with non-experimental 
data. Economic applications of matching estimators have been growing in recent years 
and they have been used for various tasks like the evaluation of policy intervention on 
the labour market (Heckman et al. 1997, Blundell et al. 2002), the impact of 
constitutions on the size of governments (Persson and Tabellini, 2002), the effect of 
dollarization on country’s economic growth (Edwards and Magendzo, 2001, 2002). 
Particulary relevant to our paper are  Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2002), Girma, 
Kneller and Pisu (2002b), Wagner (2002) and Girma and Gorg (2002) who evaluate the 
effects of exporting and of acquisitions on firms’ performances and returns to scale. 
The idea is to construct an appropriate counterfactual  by matching each investing 
firm with one with similar characteristics drawn from a sample of non-investing ones. 
Here we use the nearest neighbour matching, based on the propensity score method, 
which computes the probability of investing  (the propensity score) conditional on a 
                                                 
4 For example, in Castellani (2002a), Barba Navaretti, Castellani and Zanfei (2002), a dynamic panel 
GMM-IV estimator is implemented to test the impact of foreign investments on productivity and 
employment. 
5 The Heckman two-step estimator is another robust alternative to the IV, but it requires more 
assumptions about the structure of the model.   10 
number of observables. The key assumption needed to perform matching based on the 
propensity score is that, conditional on a vector of observables, the choice of investing 
abroad does not depend on future performance  (conditional independence assumption). 
In other words we need to rule out that relevant unobserved factors affect both the 
decision to invest and the future performance.. Then, a good selection on observables is 
critical for the success of matching, which allows to obtain a measure of the effect of 
investing abroad on performance at home as free as possible from any self-selection 
bias. This is done by estimating a probit model of the decision to become MNE that can 
be represented as follows:  
) | 1 ( 1 , - = t i it X SW P  
where Xi,t-1  is a vector of observable firm i’s characteristics at t-1. 
It is then possible to compute the probability of switching (propensity score) for 
each firm and pair each investor with its nearest neighbour, i.e. the non-investing firm 
with the closest propensity score. In other words, we build a sample where for each 
investing firm there is a firm which had a very similar ex-ante probability of switching 
but remained national. This latter group is our counterfactual
6. Subsequently, average 
performances in the group of investing firms and in the counterfactual can be compared 




1 ˆ + + D - D = t t SM y y a                (2) 
where 
1
1 + D t y  is the mean performance growth of investing firms after switching and 
0
1 + D t y  is a weighted mean of performance growth the control group over the same 
period
7. In other words, the standard matching estimator (SM) can be thought as a test 
for the equality of means in performance growth over the switching and the matched 
control groups. 
                                                 
6 In principle the number of controls should equal the number of switching firms, but in practice one 
control can be matched to more than one investing firm, so the number of control can be lower than the 
number of switching firms. The opposite may also occur: some switching firms might not have any 
“sufficiently close” neighbour and get dropped from the matched sample. 
7 In the nearest neighbour matching used in this paper, weighting is simply used to account for the fact 
that one control can be matched to more than one switching firm. Given the extremely low number of 
such multiple matching (six) we prefer to run unweighted means which facilitate the implementation of 
DID in a regression framework. However, weighted results for standard matching estimators are identical 
to unweighted ones.   11 
 
As noted in section 2, it is possible to also use another estimator  than the SM 
estimator. This is the  difference-in-difference estimator (DID). Whereas the SM 
estimators compares post-investment performance growth for the two groups of firms, 
the DID estimator  compares the difference between pre and post-investment 
performance growth in both groups. In other words,   it measures the difference in  the 
change of the steepness of the performance trajectories for the two groups of firms. 
Formally, DID, is given by:  








1 - + - + D - D - D - D = t t t t DID y y y y a ,              (3) 
where upper bars denote averages in each group performances before (t-1) and after 
(t+1) the investment year. In substance, the DID measures the differential performance 
in the group of investing firms relative to the non-investing ones, once ex-ante 
differences in performance are accounted for
8 and can be estimated from the following 










it x d d d c y e d a g g + + + + + = D ' 2 1             (4) 
where j = 0,1 denote the control and the switching firms groups respectively, t = 0,1 
denote pre- and post-investment period, while the ds are dummies taking the following 
values 
t d = 1 if t = 1 and zero otherwise, 
j d = 1 if j = 1 and zero otherwise, 
j
t d = 1 if t = 1 and j = 1 and zero otherwise. 
The OLS estimate of  DID a ˆ is the difference-in-difference estimator of the effect of 
investing on performance growth, conditional on the vector of covariates x, which 









i x d a y n d a + + + = D '            (5) 
                                                 
8 Like a first-difference estimator in linear panel data the DID aims at eliminating unobserved 
heterogeneity which might not be captured by matching and can affect post investment performance   12 
where the OLS estimate of  SM a ˆ is now the standard matching estimator.   
 
4.  Data and description of the sample  
 
The dataset we use combines the Reprint data base of the Politecnico of Milan 
(which contains information on Italian multinationals and foreign firms operating in 
Italy)  with the Aida data base of Bureau Van Dijck (which has information on balance 
sheet and other economic data of Italian firms). The two data bases have been merged 
by the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano. The panel used in this paper includes Italian firms 
with more that 20 employees with observations between1993 and 1998. The panel 
includes the three types of firms discussed in the earlier section. SWs, which set up their 
first foreign subsidiary in the period observed, MNEs which have at least one foreign 
subsidiary at the beginning of the period and NATIONALs which do not have foreign 
subsidiaries at the beginning of the period and never invest in the period observed
9. The 
starting sample included 3,029 firms, but the number of firms for which we can 
construct a balanced panel is finally 1,587 because of  missing values
10. Table 1 
summarises the composition of the sample by  investing status for each year. The first 
row includes firms which were MNEs at the beginning of the period or become such 
because they have invested abroad in the previous period. The second one reports firms 
that invested abroad that year and therefore switched status.  The third one, just includes 
national firms. Thus, every year t a number of SWs transit from being NATIONAL in t-
1 into being MNEs in t +1
11. SWs are 193 all together.  
Table 1 – Number of firms in the sample, by size class and investing status 
Year  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Multinational in year t (beginning of period)  279  321  330  362  371 
Switch in year t  42  32  32  45  42 
National in year t  1,266  1,234  1,225  1,180  1,174 
 
                                                 
9 The reprint data base contains a representative sample of Italian foreign investors. National firms, which 
are not reported in the Reprint data base, are drawn at random from the Aida data base 
10 In particular, firms with less than 4 out of 6 years of data on employment, output and TFP were 
excluded. Occasional missing values occurring in the series for the remaining 1,587 firms were estimated 
using linear interpolation. 
11 Reprint allows to recover disinvestments only every two years (1995 and 1997), so in 1995 and 1997 
MNE t = MNE t-1 + SWt-1 – EXIT, where EXIT denote firms which were multinationals in t-2 and have no 
foreign subsidiaries in t. Similarly, in 1995 and 1997, NATIONAL t = NATIONAL t-1 – SWt-1 + EXIT.   13 
 
Figure 2 a-c is the empirical implementation of figure 1. We report average 
performance trajectories for the there groups of firms between 1993 and 1997. Note that 
firms that are classified as MNEs are only those that were already such at the beginning 
of the period and those classified as switching are those which switched in any year 
between 1994 and 1997. Thus we cannot single out a specific year of the investment in 
this picture, but all firms classified as SWs had no foreign investments at the beginning 
of the period and have at least one at the end of it. 
 
These real world trajectories fit remarkably the theoretical ones of Figure 1. MNEs 
are larger and more productive than NATIONALs.  Switching firms outperform 
NATIONALs ex-ante. TFP and turnover (and, to a lesser extent, employment) 
trajectories of SWs become steeper during the period under investigation, supporting 
the idea that investing abroad enhances their economic performance. However, not 
much can be concluded from these average trends. To single out the effects of the 
investment we proceed as outlined in sections 2 and 3. We focus our analysis on the 
comparison between SWs and NATIONALs (we leave out MNEs from now onwards); 
we construct a counterfactual of nationals by using the matching technique; we compare 
performance of SWs and the counterfactual.    14 


































































5.  Construction of the counterfactual 
 
We now focus on switching firms. As we need to compare pre and post investment 
performances we are forced to drop firms which invest  in 1993 and 1994. In fact, we 
can observe pre-investment performance growth only starting with firms switching in 
1995. Thus, the number of switching firms analysed falls to 119. These firms become 
multinationals either in 1995, in 1996 or 1997. We observe their economic performance 
from 1993 to 1998. In Figure 3 we report the time structure of  the investment pattern of 
SWs   15 
Figure 3 – The time structure of investment patterns
  
As discussed in the previous section a careful analysis of the effect of investing 
abroad requires that the appropriate counterfactual is constructed. This will be derived 
from the sub-sample of NATIONALs that do not invest over the 1995-1997 period by 
way of the propensity score matching technique. We start by running a Probit regression 
to derive the probability of investing as a function of observable firm-specific 
characteristics: 
) 96 , 95 , , , , , | 1 ( 1 , 1 , 1 , yr yr P S F E Z SW P i i t i t i t i it - - - =          (5) 
where Zi,t-1 is a vector of firms’ attributes such as size, age, share of intangible assets on 
total assets, Ei,t-1 is a vector of efficiency and profitability measures such as TFP, 
operating margin per employee and ROI, Fi,t-1  is a vector of financial variables such as 
the ratio of debt to total assets and the share of cash flow in total capital, while Si and Pi 
are sector and province dummies, while yr95 and yr96 are two time dummies. The 
results of the estimation of (5) are reported in table 2 and support the hypothesis that 
size, productivity and profitability are important determinants of the choice of becoming 
a multinational firm. In other words, we confirm that multinationals have some ex-ante 
advantage over national firms, which allow them to overcome the costs and risks of 
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N. of switching firms   16 
Table 2 – Probit for the probability of switching 
Variable  Coeff.    Std. Error 
(Log) TFPi, t-1   .411**  (.197) 
(Log) N. employeesi, t-1  .509**  (.058) 
Profits per employeei, t-1  .007**  (.002) 
ROI i, t-1  .799  (.919) 
(Log) Agei, t-1  .129  (.084) 
Capitalized R&D/Total assets i, t-1  4.130  (3.349) 
Debt/Total assets i, t-1  .397  (.326) 
Cash flow/fixed capital I, t-1   -.197**  (.056) 
Sector dummies  Yes 
Province dummies  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes 
N. observations  2,960 
Pseudo R-squared  .227 
**: p<.05; *: p<.10 
As recalled in section 3, matching techniques assume conditional independence, 
that is we need to rule out that the choice of investing abroad is significantly affected by 
unobservable variables which also determine post investment performance. This is not 
easy to ensure and test in empirical work, mainly due to data limitation. Here we tried to 
control for as many observable firms’ characteristics as possible (including a large set of 
sector and province dummies) given our data constraint, and reached a satisfactory 
result in terms of explained variance, as indicated by a Pseudo-R
2 of 22.7%, which is in 
line with most existing works using matching techniques.  
A good matching should also result in characteristics of the counterfactual as 
close as possible to those of the investing firms. In formal terms, the matched sample 
should satisfy the balancing property, that is the distribution of the vector of observables 
should be balanced across switching and control firms. In Table 3 we compare the 
average characteristics of SWs to those of NATIONALs before the matching and to 
those of the matched sample of NATIONALs, the counterfactual. SWs and 
NATIONALs are quite different firms. The first two columns of Table 3 report the 
mean values of characteristics of the two groups of firms and the third column reports 
the p-value for the test of equality of means in the two groups.  Switching firms are 
larger (employment and turnover are four times larger, while total assets are more than 
7 times higher in switching firms), more productive (TFP is 20% higher) and profitable   17 
(operating profit per employee is twice as high), pay higher wages, and are less 
vertically integrated (value added per unit of output is 1.7% lower).  
 
Propensity score matching mitigates such differences substantially. As shown in 
the last three columns of table 3, there are no significant differences in the means 
between SWs firms and matched
12. It is noticeable that differences disappear not only in 
variables used as regressors  in (5) (TFP, employment, profits per employee, share of 
R&D to total assets, age, share of debt to total assets, cash flow to tangible capital), but 
also other variables such as wages, value added per unit of output, total, tangible, 
intangible and current assets,  profits
13.  
Table 3 – Switching firms and control groups, various characteristics (means)  
  Unmatched sample  Matched sample 
  Switching  Control  Test for the 
equality of 
means (p-value) 
Switching  Control  Test for the 
equality of 
means (p-value) 
N. of observations  119  3,415    109  103   
Turnover
§  145,726  37,579  3.082**  110,086  144,669  -.773 
N. employees  347  92  2.709**  263  256  .099 
TFP  1.214  .997  4.503**  1.176  1.196  -.347 
Pre-tax P/L
§  6,187  1,185  3.363**  4,610  3,642  .461 
Operating P/L
§  8,676  1,932  3.186**  6,270  7,419  -.529 
Operating profit per employee  38.4  21.9  3.42**  35.7  39.4  -.471 
Average wage
§  60.8  57.8  2.059**  60.4  61.0  -.297 
Value added per unit of output
§  27.4%  29.1%  -1.59*  27.6  28.5  -.547 
Age  24  23  1.291  24  23  .243 
Total assets
§  213,303  29,476  1.819**  116,474  103,328  .351 
Tangibile assets
§  23,004  6,583  2.925**  19,277  21,726  -.456 
Intangibile assets
§  3,314  750  1.636**  1,671  4,003  -.986 
Share of intang. assets on total
§  2.1%  1.6%  .824  1.6%  2.4%  -1.246 
Capitalized R&D investments
§  274.0  29.4  1.116  286.5  153.8  .548 
R&D on total assets  0.2%  0.1%  .986  0.3%  0.4%  -.535 
Current assets
§  169,619  19,778  1.687**  84,684  61,515  .808 
Share of debt on total assets  67.6%  67%  .401  67.6%  67.8%  -.087 
Interests paid on total debt
§  6.1%  5.8%  .92  6%  6.2%  -.358 
Cash flow on tangible capital  .521  .727  -1.335  .468  .611  -1.027 
§ Variables which were not included in the probit used to compute the propensity score 
                                                 
12 The number of switching firms decreases from 119 to 109 in the matched sample. This is due to the fact 
in 10 cases the propensity score of nearest neighbour was more than 5% different from the switching 
firm, so we decided to drop such firm, increasing the overall quality of the matching. The number of 
control is lower than the number of switching simply because some national firm is matched to more than 
one investor. 
13 As a more formal test for the matching satisfying the balancing property, we followed Sianesi (2004) 
and ran the selection probit on the matched sample. As expected, we found that Pseudo R
2 drops 
significantly (from .22 in the whole sample to .07 in the matched sample) and no regressor is significant, 
neither individually nor jointly.   18 
 
6.  The effects of investing abroad: results 
 
We now use the matched sample to estimate  the impact of the creation of foreign 
subsidiaries on firms’ performances. We use both the standard matching estimator (SM) 
and the difference-in-difference (DID) estimator. Our outcome variables are three 
indicators of firms’ economic performances: TFP growth
14, employment growth and 
output (measured by total sales) growth. There are obvious relations among these three 
indicators, such as for example the effect of an expansion in output on employment 
growth and on productive efficiency (through economies of scale), or the impact of an 
increase in TFP on output growth (through an increase of international competitiveness 
or employment (through factor mix reallocation), which we leave for further 
investigation. Here we just concentrate on a robust estimation of the partial effect of 
investing abroad on the three indicators, without discussing their interlinkages and the 
channels through which these effects occur.  
 
In table 4 we report estimates of the effect of investing abroad, using both DID and 
SM (from equations 4 and 5). We compute bootstrapped standard errors to adjust for 
additional sources of variability introduced by the estimation of the propensity score as 
well as the matching process and we control for other post-investment sources of 
variation in performances, such as the contemporaneous growth rate in the stock of 
capital, the operating profit per employee, the average wage, the share of intangible on 
total assets  and  of cash flow on tangible assets. The effect of investing slightly drops 
when we introduce such controls, and the SM estimate of the effect on TFP growth 
turns out to be non-significantly different from zero. However, DID estimators are 
robust to the introduction of controls and suggest that switching firms experience a 
8.8% higher growth rate in output and a 4.9% higher growth rate in TFP
15. We find no 
                                                 
14 TFP growth is obtained as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas gross output production function estimated 
from a random effect model with an AR(1) disturbance term. Elasticities to capital, labour and materials 
have been allowed to vary across 2-digit industries. 
15 It is worth mentioning that standard NN yields lower causal effect of investing on performances then 
DID. This result is comforting as DID improves upon standard matching estimators as it controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity in performances of treated firms as opposed to non-treated ones (Blundell and 
Costa Dias, 1999, 2002).    19 
significant effect on the rate of employment growth after accounting for pre-investment 
performance (DID) and controlling for other sources of variation . 
Table 4 – The effect of investing abroad on firms’ performances, 1993-1998 
Dep. Variable  Turnover Growth 
Estimator  SM  DID  SM  DID 
















         
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control variables*  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  212  422  212  422 
R-squared  .018  .029  .224  .187 
   
Dep. Variable  TFP Growth 
Estimator  SM  DID  SM  DID 








         








         
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control variables*  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  212  422  212  422 
R-squared  .018  .029  .528  .466 
   
Dep. Variable  Employment growth 
Estimator  SM  DID  SM  DID 








         








         
Constant  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control variables*  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  212  422  212  422 
R-squared  .013  .049  .585  .461 
* Control variables include: growth rate in share in intangible assets, capital stock, profits per 
employee, wage, share of cash flow in total capital and turnover (only for TFP and employment 
growth). Asterisks denote significance level at 5% (**) and 10% (*), based on bootstrapped 
standard errors (500 repetitions).  20 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Most of the literature focuses on the impact of MNEs in host economies. 
However, the activities of MNEs have also important effects in home economies. The 
debate is ambiguous: concerns that foreign investments may deplete domestic 
economies are often coupled with the pride for doing good business in foreign 
countries. This ambiguity derives from a poor understanding of the problem and from 
the lack of data sets allowing for targeted empirical analysis. This paper can address 
these concerns by comparing the home performance of a sample of Italian firms which 
have invested abroad for the first time in the period observed to the one of a 
counterfactual of firms which have not invested abroad. This type of analysis is possible 
thanks to a new data set on Italy which combines information on multinationals and 
national firms. The time frame of the data set also makes it possible to compare 
performances before and after the investment.  
 
The problem  is defining the right counterfactual. For the welfare of the home country 
what matters is what would have happened to investing firms if they had not invested. 
By using  propensity score matching, it is possible to construct a counterfactual of 
national firms that never invest abroad which replicates this hypothetical performance.  
 
We  find that investing abroad significantly enhances performance at home. The 
rate of growth of total factor productivity and of output is significantly higher for 
investing firms and it accelerates after the investment takes place. This result is robust 
to the inclusion of different controls. We also find that investing has no significant 
effect on employment growth.  
 
These findings imply that foreign investments are often strategic moves 
undertaken to strengthen home activities. Also, concerns about the employment effects 
of foreign investments and delocalisation are not supported by our analysis. In our 
sample the employment trend of investing firms is never worse and under some tests   21 
even better than for the counterfactual. In this perspective actions aimed at discouraging 
foreign investments and the creation of foreign employments seem short sighted and 
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